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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
language conflicts with Maryland's judicially created Frye-Reed stan-
dard. Nevertheless, proper application of Maryland's new rules of evi-
dence, consideration of the underlying goals of codification, and
judicial deference to the sources of the Maryland rules, dictate that
this conflict should be resolved by resort to the traditional relevancy
analysis contained within the rules themselves.
KEVIN M. CARROLL
B. Residual Hearsay Exceptions: A New Opening?
In a significant change from Maryland's common law, the newly
adopted Maryland Rules of Evidence1 provide for the admission of
hearsay evidence that does not fall within one of the commonly recog-
nized exceptions to the hearsay rule.' These exceptions are known as
the residual hearsay exceptions. Maryland Rule 5-803(b) (24)
provides:
Under exceptional circumstances, the following are not ex-
cluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness: A statement not specifically covered by
any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court deter-
mines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. A statement may not be admitted under this ex-
ception unless the proponent of it makes known to the ad-
verse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare
to meet it, the intention to offer the statement and the par-
ticulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.'
1. 21 Md. Reg. 1 (Jan. 7, 1994).
2. Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted." MD. R. 5-801(c). Maryland Rule 5-803 lists 22 exceptions to the hearsay rule that
are applicable even though the hearsay declarant is available to testify. MD. R. 5-803(b).
3. MD. R. 5-803(b)(24).
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Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(5) is identical to rule 5-803(b)(24), except
that it applies only when a declarant is unavailable as a witness.4 A
Rules Committee note, appended to Maryland Rule 5-803(b) (24) and
cross-referenced at Maryland Rule 5-804(b) (5), makes clear the Com-
mittee's intention that such hearsay is to be admitted only in very lim-
ited situations.'
This Note will trace the history of both the Maryland and the fed-
eral residual hearsay exceptions and then discuss the different ways in
which the federal circuit courts have administered the rule. The Note
addresses interpretive questions that will arise in applying the Mary-
land Rule. Finally, the Note predicts how Maryland courts will apply
the rules and their potential impact on trial practice in Maryland.
1. The History of Residual Hearsay in Maryland and the Federal
System. -
a. Maryland Common Law Before July 1, 1994.-Prior to the
adoption of the new Rules of Evidence, Maryland courts maintained
that they did not recognize a residual, or "catch-all," exception to the
hearsay rule.6 Despite this express non-acceptance, Maryland courts
have on rare occasions admitted hearsay evidence that does not fit
into a traditional category. In Foster v. State,7 the Court of Appeals
reversed a murder conviction and ordered a new trial because the
hearsay rule operated to exclude evidence "necessary to the accused's
defense," and which bore "sufficient indicia of reliability ... to assure
... trustworthiness."' The court reasoned that "'the hearsay rule may
not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice."'9 The
exclusion of the hearsay evidence in Foster violated the defendant's
constitutionally mandated right to due process of law.1°
4. MD. R. 5-804(b) (5). Unavailability is defined as death, illness, lack of memory, op-
eration of a privilege, a refusal to testify despite a court order, and absence from the hear-
ing when the proponent has been able to procure attendance. Mn. R. 5-804(a). A
declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the absence is due to wrongdoing on the part of
the proponent of the statement. Id. Maryland Rule 5-804 also lists four other exceptions
that operate when the declarant is unavailable. MD. R. 5-804(b).
5. See MD. R. 5-803 committee note ("It is intended that the residual hearsay excep-
tion will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.").
6. See, e.g., Cain v. Maryland, 63 Md. App. 227, 234, 492 A.2d 652, 656 ("Maryland has
yet to adopt" a catch-all hearsay exception), cert. denied, 304 Md. 300, 498 A.2d 1186 (1985).
7. 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073
(1984).
8. Id. at 211, 464 A.2d at 997.
9. Id. at 208, 464 A.2d at 995 (quoting Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 96-97 (1979)
(per curiam)).
10. Id. at 212, 464 A.2d at 997.
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The Court of Appeals has also allowed the admission of "reason-
ably reliable," nontraditional hearsay in parole revocation hearings"
and conditional release revocation hearings. 12 The court has noted,
however, that "the rules of evidence, including rules against the ad-
mission of hearsay, are relaxed at [such] hearings."13
b. History of the Rules in the Committee. -In 1993, the Evidence
Subcommittee of the Maryland Rules Committee recommended
against including the residual exceptions in the new Maryland Rules
of Evidence.14 The full Committee later deadlocked on a motion to
reject the Subcommittee's recommendation to exclude the residual
exceptions.1 5 Opposition to the exception encompassed two view-
points: some feared that a residual exception would swallow up the
hearsay rule with too many qualifying conditions while others on the
Committee believed that a codified residual exception would unduly
limit the development of hearsay jurisprudence and confine the use
of hearsay too much.16 The full Committee apprised the Court of Ap-
peals of the Subcommittee's recommendation against the rule, and
that the full Committee was split evenly on the issue.
17
The court then reviewed two versions of the proposed rules, one
substantively mirroring the federal rule, the second containing the
limiting prefix, "Under exceptional circumstances."" The Court of
Appeals voted to adopt the residual exceptions and opted to include
the limiting prefix. 9
c. History of Residual Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence.-
At the time initial work began on the codification of the federal rules
of evidence, the Fifth Circuit handed down a landmark ruling in Dal-
las County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.2" that is widely viewed as
the genesis of the movement to incorporate a residual hearsay excep-
11. See, e.g., Bailey v. State, 327 Md. 689, 612 A.2d 288 (1992) (holding hearsay evi-
dence admissible for limited purpose of proving that probationer had not completed re-
quired program).
12. See, e.g., Bergstein v. State, 322 Md. 506, 588 A.2d 779 (1991) (holding reliable
hearsay admissible at conditional release revocation hearing).
13. Bailey, 327 Md. at 698, 612 A.2d at 292.
14. MD. RULES COMMrrrEE, May 14, 1993, MINUTES, at 4.
15. Id. at 8.
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id. at 8.
18. See LYNN McLJN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 268 (1994).
19. Id. at 269.
20. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
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tion into the Federal Rules of Evidence. 1 In Dallas County, the central
issue concerned whether the collapse of the tower on the old county
courthouse in Selma, Alabama, was caused by lightning, which was
covered by insurance, or by existing weakness and deterioration,
which was not covered.22 The Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's
decision to admit a fifty-eight-year-old newspaper article, which de-
scribed a fire in the courthouse, even though the article did not fit
into one of the "happily tagged species of hearsay exception." 3 The
circuit court held that the article was "necessary and trustworthy, rele-
vant and material, and its admission is within the trial judge's exercise
of discretion."24 In the wake of Dallas County, the 1969 text of Pro-
posed Federal Rule of Evidence 803-Hearsay Exceptions-was even
more permissive than the rule as eventually adopted. 5 Proposed Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 803(a) said only that "[a] statement is not ex-
cluded by the hearsay rule if its nature and the special circumstances
under which it was made offer assurances of accuracy."2 6 To mirror
the established common-law exceptions to hearsay rule, Proposed
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(b) listed twenty-three categories of ad-
missible statements, but only "[b]y way of illustration ... and not by
way of limitation. "27 By 1971, this permissive approach to the hearsay
rule was largely abandoned, with the adoption of the twenty-three "il-
lustrations" as express exceptions in themselves.28 The residual excep-
tion was added at this time.2 9 The Supreme Court later approved this
revised version in November 1972.30 The Court then sent the pro-
posed rules to Congress on February 5, 1973.1 Before the rules could
21. See, e.g., James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay Exception Reconsidered, 20 FLA. ST. U.
L. Rxv. 787, 791 (1993); David A. Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay
Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 867, 868 (1982).
22. Dallas County, 286 F.2d at 390.
23. Id. at 397-98.
24. Id. at 398.
25. See, e.g., Sonenshein, supra note 21, at 871; Conmittee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminaty Draft of Proposed Rules
of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 345 (1969) (lan-
guage of draft rule).
26. 46 F.R.D. at 345.
27. Id.
28. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 419-22 (1971).
29. Id. at 322.
30. H.R. REP. No. 52, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973).
31. Communication from the Chief Justice of the United States, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.CAN. 7074, 7074-75.
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take effect, however, Congress intervened and deferred their
enactment.
3 2
The House of Representatives elected to remove the residual ex-
ception to the hearsay rule altogether because it would inject "too
much uncertainty into the law of evidence and impair[ ] the ability of
practitioners to prepare for trial."33 The Senate rejected this change,
and reintroduced a residual exception, arguing that "without a sepa-
rate residual provision, the specifically enumerated exceptions could
become tortured beyond any reasonable circumstances which they
were intended to include (even if broadly construed) ."3' The confer-
ence committee added a notice requirement to the Senate's version of
the residual exception.35
d. Evolution of the Rule in the Federal Court System.-Even
before Maryland adopted rules of evidence based on the scheme of
the Federal Rules, the Court of Appeals had indicated a willingness to
look to the Federal Rules for guidance in the resolution of evidentiary
questions.36 This history makes it likely that when novel questions
arise with respect to the new Maryland Rules of Evidence, the Court of
Appeals will again look to federal jurisprudence for insight.
An initial matter for the Maryland courts that the federal circuits
have resolved is the admission of "near misses"-hearsay that is inad-
missible although it very nearly meets the standards of a traditional
32. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. The House Report recom-
mending the intervention listed five concerns. H.R. REP. No. 52, at 3-4. The Committee
on the Judiciary questioned whether there were constitutional impediments to the promul-
gation of rules by the Supreme Court, whether the rules were within the purview of the
authority of the Court, the wisdom of uniformity throughout the federal court system as
opposed to uniformity between a federal court and the state locality in which it sits, and
whether the proposed rules had been given enough exposure for commentary. Id. at 3.
The Committee also recommended congressional examination of whether the rules
should be adopted in their present form. Id. at 4. The House Report concluded:
[1]t has become clear there is enough controversy wrapped up in the 168 pages of
rules and Advisory Committee notes that the rules should not be permitted to
become effective without an affirmative act of Congress, and then, only to the
extent and with such amendments, as the Congress shall approve.
Id.
33. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973).
34. S. REp. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974).
35. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974).
36. See B&K Rentals & Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 324 Md. 147, 158-59,
596 A.2d 640, 646 (1991) (changing Maryland law concerning whether statement by agent
constitutes admission of party opponent to "place Maryland in accord with the clear major-
ity of states that have adopted the principle embodied in FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (2) (D)');
Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 612, 495 A.2d 348, 363-64 (1985) (recog-
nizing public records exception to hearsay rule in same form as it appears in FED. R. EVID.
803(8)).
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exception." The rationale given for the admission of near-misses is
that, "[w]here evidence complies with the spirit, if not the l[e]tter of
several exceptions, admissibility is appropriate under the residual ex-
ception.""8 Courts refusing to admit near-misses counter that the enu-
merated exceptions have specific requirements of reliability which
must be satisfied in order to justify admission, and that failure to do so
should preclude a finding of trustworthiness.3 9 In an attempt to se-
cure the foundation on which traditional exceptions are based, one
commentator urges courts that admit near-misses to do so only "when
the court can articulate a circumstance in the making of the statement
that substitutes for the missing enumerated elements and thus pro-
vides equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness. " '
To ensure the reliability of admitted residual hearsay evidence,
the new Maryland Rules impose four substantive and one procedural
requirement as a precondition to admission: (1) the statement must
have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) be
offered as evidence of a material fact; (3) be more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence produced or
procurable through reasonable efforts; and (4) serve the general pur-
poses of the rules and interest ofjustice by its admission.41 Finally, the
adverse party must have notice of its opponent's intent to introduce
the hearsay.42 In practice, the circuits have interpreted several of the
above criteria differently.43
The first requirement, that the proffered evidence have
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is a broad
standard, "limited only by the imagination." 44 Among the circuits, the
evolution of this standard has followed three paths. Some courts will
37. An example of a "near miss" would be a 19-year-old document. Such a document
would fiall just short of the 20 year age requirement proscribed by the "ancient documents"
exception to the hearsay rule. See MD. R. 5-803(b)(16) (admitting "[s] tatements in a docu-
ment in existence twenty years or more, the authenticity of which is established, unless the
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.").
38. United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1350 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833
(1979).
39. See United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding statement made
after charges were dropped was not made against interest even though declarant was still
in custody). For a discussion of the "near-miss" question, see Gary W. Majors, Comment,
Admitting "Near Misses" Under the Residual Hearsay Exceptions, 66 OR. L. Rxv. 599 (1988).
40. Sonenshein, supra note 21, at 888.
41. MD. R. 5-803(b) (24); MD. R. 5-804(b) (5).
42. MD. R. 5-803(b) (24); MD. R. 5-804(b) (5).
43. See Beaver, supra note 21, at 800-02 (discussing the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Cir-
cuits' interpretations). See generally Sonenshein, supra note 21 (interpreting the residual
exceptions to allow for the growth and development of the hearsay exceptions).
44. Beaver, supra note 21, at 795-96.
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look only to "extrinsic" facts concerning the reliability of the hearsay
in question, such as the availability of the hearsay declarant for cross
examination or the existence of other evidence corroborating the
hearsay statement.45 Other courts have considered "intrinsic" facts,
which are the circumstances surrounding the actual making of the
hearsay itself.' Still others will consider both extrinsic and intrinsic
facts.47 The Fourth Circuit has in different cases considered both ex-
trinsic corroborative evidence' 8 and intrinsic factors49 to evaluate the
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
The second requirement, that the offered hearsay be evidence of
a material fact, is a redundancy and has rarely been considered.5" If
the evidence offered is not material it will not pass the threshold test
of relevancy and materiality contained in Federal Rules of Evidence
401 and 402.51
The proffered evidence must also be more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence produced or readily
producible through reasonable efforts.52 Although this is a potentially
significant limitation to the admission of hearsay under the residual
exceptions, this test has occasionally been weakened. Courts, how-
ever, have refused to admit hearsay either because it is not the most
45. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding admis-
sion of evidence under residual hearsay exception because declarant was available for cross
examination and statement was corroborated by other testimony).
46. See, e.g., Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness ... are those that existed at the time the
statement was made and do not include those that may be added by using hindsight").
47. See, e.g., United States v. Van Lufkins, 676 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1982) (upholding
admission of hearsay evidence under residual exception because statement was made
under fortuitous circumstances shortly after incident and corroborated by other evidence).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Garner, 574 F,2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir.) (upholding admis-
sion of sworn grand jury testimony of witness who refused to testify at trial because testi-
mony was corroborated by another witness and by airline tickets, customs declarations,
passport declarations, and hotel records), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 2 F.3d 81, 83 (4th Cir. 1993) (approving the admis-
sion of testimony from suppression hearing because declarant, who later refused to testify,
"'had no motive to lie at that hearing or to implicate his brother'") (quoting district court
judge), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1194 (1994).
50. SeeJoseph W. Rand, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: The Futile and
Misguided Attempt to Restrain Judicial Discretion, 80 GEO. LJ. 873, 881-83 (1992).
51. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R_ EvD. 401. "Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EVID. 402. It follows that evidence not pertaining
to a material fact is not relevant and therefore, inadmissible. The Maryland Rules are
identical. See MD. R. 5-401; MD. R. 5-402.
52. MD. R. 5-803(b)(24)(B); MD. R. 5-804(b)(5)(B).
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probative on point5 or because other evidence was reasonably avail-
able.' Other courts have eased the proponent's burden significantly,
saying "the jury [is] entitled to all the help available."55 The Fourth
Circuit has strictly applied the probativeness requirement and indi-
cated that evidence must be the most probative on the point for which
it is offered.56 The court has also excluded evidence where other simi-
larly probative evidence was readily available.5 7
The fourth requirement, that admission of the hearsay must serve
the general purposes of the rules and the interest ofjustice,5 8 is essen-
tially a redundant requirement. Courts hold that it "is simply a fur-
ther emphasis upon the showing of necessity and reliability and a
caution that the hearsay rule should not be lightly disregarded and
the admission should be reconciled with the philosophy expressed in
Rule 102.""9 One court, that believed a witness had been intimidated
into refusing to testify at trial, allowed that witness's otherwise inad-
missible grand jury testimony to be introduced under the residual ex-
ception. 60 The court used the "interest ofjustice" requirement, not as
a test of admissibility, but as a central argument to allow the introduc-
tion of the grand jury testimony. 1
53. See, e.g., Polansky v. CNA Ins. Co., 852 F.2d 626 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that letter
indicating plaintiffs belief not more probative when plaintiff was available to testify).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (reasoning that telex of
bank verifying withdrawal not admissible because proponent did not demonstrate inability
to produce admissible business records).
55. United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554, 559 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977). In Iaconetti, the defendant, a government
contract inspector, had been recorded soliciting a bribe from a potential contractor. Id. at
556. The defendant testified that the tapes had been misinterpreted but the court allowed
the business partners of the contractor to testify that he had told them of the bribe attempt
the day it occurred. Id. This testimony was allowed despite the availability of the tapes and
the likelihood that tapes of the actual conversations in question were more probative as to
defendant's intent than the contractor's perception. Id. at 557-59.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 696 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1982) (indicating that
grand jury testimony that was no more probative than another witness's testimony should
have been excluded), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding district
court's refusal to admit attorney's memorandum detailing decedent's bank transaction
when bank official could have been called to testify), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985).
58. See MD. R. 5-803(b)(24) (C); MD. R. 5-804(b)(5)(C).
59. United States v. Friedman, 593 F.2d 109, 119 (9th Cir. 1979). Rule 102 states the
purpose of the rules of evidence: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EVID. 102.
60. See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1354-55 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 914 (1977).
61. Id. at 1355.
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In addition to the four substantive requirements, the residual
hearsay exceptions impose a procedural notice requirement.6 2 The
language of the notice requirement would appear to leave little room
for flexibility. But this has not been the case in several federal circuits,
which have taken a relaxed view of the notice requirement.6" Among
the factors courts have weighed in the application of this requirement
are whether the proponent knew of the need to use the particular
evidence in advance of trial," whether the offeror is blameless for fail-
ure to notify the opposite party,6' and whether the opponent has "'a
fair opportunity to prepare to contest the use of the statement."'66
The Second Circuit, however, has applied the notice requirement
strictly.67 The Fourth Circuit has taken note of this strict interpreta-
tion of the notice requirement, but has also recognized the practical
reality that "[w] hen new evidence is uncovered on the eve of trial, ...
62. MD. R. 5-803(b)(24); MD. R. 5-804(b)(5).
63. Several commentators view this "flexible notice" approach to be more in line with
the realities of litigation. See Thomas Black, Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) & 804(b)(5)-
The Residual Exceptions-An Overview, 25 Hous. L. REv. 13, 55-56 (1988); Sonenshein, supra
note 21, at 901-05.
64. See, e.g., Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1355. In Carlson, the government realized it needed to
offer the hearsay testimony only when their witness refused a court order to testify. Id.
The court allowed admission of the witness's grand jury testimony under Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b) (5). Id. The Carlson court noted that the defendant could have sought a
continuance but chose not to do so. Id.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978). In a prosecution
for bank robbery, the government did not learn until after the trial had begun that an
accomplice would not testify in accord with statements he had made about the defendant's
participation in the crime. Id. at 344. The court stated that "the purpose of the rules and
the requirement of fairness to an adversary contained in the.., notice requirement.., are
satisfied when . .. the proponent of the evidence is without fault in failing to notify his
adversary prior to trial[.]" Id. at 348. The court ultimately ruled that the evidence should
not have been admitted, but on grounds that the statement lacked trustworthiness and not
because the notice requirement was violated. Id. at 349-50.
66. Id. at 348 (quoting H. Cowt. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)). In an
expansive application of the flexible notice approach, the First Circuit accepted the affida-
vit of a deceased lawyer under the residual exception even after noting that the offerors of
the evidence could not "be presumed blameless" because they did not attempt to explain
their failure to give pretrial notice. Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 902 (1st Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980). The court inferred that the defense had prepared to meet
the evidence because the defense had been in possession of the document for seven and
one-half years and because defense counsel had indicated that he anticipated the introduc-
tion of the document. Id.; see aso United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1976)
(holding that even if government did not comply with notice requirement, defendant was
not harmed because "his counsel had a fair opportunity to meet the statements").
67. See, e.g., United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 358 (2d Cir. 1978) ("'There is abso-
lutely no doubt that Congress intended that the requirement of advance notice be rigidly
enforced.'") (quoting United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 72 n.30 (2d Cir. 1977)).
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advance notice is obviously impossible."' In this particular situation
the Fourth Circuit expressly accepted a flexible notice standard,
although it limited its holding to "the exceptional circumstances of
this case. "69
2. Application of the Rule in Maryland.-The Committee note,
adopted under both Maryland Rule 5-803(b) (24) and Maryland Rule
5-804(b) (5), gives a strong indication of the Committee's intention
that residual hearsay is a very limited exception:
The residual exceptions . . .do not contemplate an unfet-
tered exercise of judicial discretion, but they do provide for
treating new and presently unanticipated situations which
demonstrate a trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifi-
cally stated exceptions. Within this framework, room is left
for growth and development of the law of evidence in the
hearsay area, consistently with the broad purposes expressed
in Rule 5-102.7o
The language of the comparable federal advisory note, however, goes
on to recognize that "all possible desirable exceptions to the hearsay
rule have [not] been catalogued."7" This language is conspicuously
absent from the Maryland note. The Maryland note instead stresses
the limited availability of the residual hearsay exception:
It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be
used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. The
Committee does not intend to establish a broad license for
trial judges to admit hearsay statements that do not fall
within one of the other exceptions contained in Rules 5-803
and 5-804(b). The residual exceptions are not meant to au-
thorize major judicial revisions of the hearsay rule, including
its present exceptions. Such major revisions are best accom-
plished by amendments to the Rule itself. It is intended that
in any case in which evidence is sought to be admitted under
68. United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299 n.1 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1105 (1985).
69. United States v. Baker, 985 F.2d 1248, 1253 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
682 (1994). The court sustained admission of hearsay under the residual exception absent
pretrial notice due to a "last-minute need for the testimony" and because the provision of
such notice "was wholly impracticable." Id. at 1253 n.3. The government stated that the
unavailable wimess had been hidden to prevent her testimony. Id. The court deemed the
government's subpoena and subsequent search for the woman as "reasonable efforts" be-
cause the government had no indication that her testimony would be necessary until the
defense presented its case. Id.
70. MD. R. 5-803(b) (24) committee note; ef. Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) advisory committee's
note (using substantially the same language).
71. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) advisory committee's note.
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these subsections, the trial judge will exercise no less care,
reflection, and caution than the courts did under the com-
mon law in establishing the now-recognized exceptions to
the hearsay rule.72
As an initial matter, the wording of the note makes it probable
that the residual exceptions should not operate to allow admissions of
"near-misses."17 The exceptions, rather, are only for "new and pres-
ently unanticipated situations." 4 More significantly, the admission of
a near-miss would be a de facto revision of the current hearsay rule
and its exceptions. The Committee note specifically commands trial
judges not to do so, saying that such revisions are best accomplished
by actual amendments to the rules."5
While it is obvious that the residual hearsay exceptions will be
used rarely, precisely how the Maryland courts will resolve interpretive
questions already litigated in the federal courts is unclear. Based on
the federal experience, it is likely that the materiality and interest of
justice requirements for admissibility will not generate very much dis-
cussion. The interpretation of the remaining three criteria-the pres-
ence of equivalent circumstantial guarantees, whether other evidence
is probative, and the flexibility of the notice requirement-is central
to the future application of rules 5-803(24) and 5-804(b)(5).
a. Equivalent Circumstantial Guarantees.-In Maryland, non-
traditional hearsay is already admissible in parole and conditional re-
lease revocation hearings "if the trial judge decides that it is reason-
ably reliable and determines that there is good cause for its
admission." 6 The Court of Appeals inquiry into what makes hearsay
reasonably reliable provides insight into what might constitute the
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness called for by
Rules 5-803(b) (24) and 5-804(b) (5).
In Bailey v. State,7 7 the court considered whether a letter from pe-
titioner's residential treatment center that indicated a violation of the
terms of his parole was correctly admitted into evidence as "reasonably
72. MD. R. 5-803(b) (24) committee note. The text of the paragraph essentially dupli-
cates a paragraph of Senate Report 93-1277, which, in part, reintroduced the residual ex-
ception after it had been eliminated by the House of Representatives. See S. REP. No. 1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974).
73. See McLain, supra note 18, at 269.
74. MD. R. 5-803(b)(24) committee note.
75. MD. R. 5-803(b) (24) committee note ("The residual exceptions are not meant to
authorize major judicial revisions of the hearsay rule, including its present exceptions.").
76. Bailey v. State, 327 Md. 689, 699, 612 A.2d 288, 292-93 (1992); see supra notes 11-13
and accompanying text.
77. 327 Md. 689, 612 A.2d 288 (1992).
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reliable" hearsay.7" To determine the letter's reliability, the court
looked both to extrinsic guarantees of trustworthiness and to intrinsic
circumstances that surround the creation of the statement.79 In look-
ing outside the actual creation of the hearsay statement, the court
noted that the letter was corroborated by petitioner's "tacit admis-
sions."s° In consideration of the inherent trustworthiness of the state-
ment, the court held that the treatment center's "special role in the
State's probation system"81 and its obligation to report any violations
of petitioner to the Division of Parole and Probation gave the docu-
ment the necessary degree of reliability and credibility.8 2 This dual
test of intrinsic reliability and extrinsic corroboration is identical to
the test promulgated by several federal circuits for the consideration
of residual hearsay in the context of Federal Rules of Evidence
803(24) and 803(b) (5).83 It is plausible that the Maryland Court of
Appeals could choose to follow the test it has used in parole hearings,
but the Rules of Evidence are generally relaxed in those proceed-
ings.8 4 The court could also opt to re-examine its standards on the
trustworthiness of hearsay in the context of the residual exceptions.
Until the court definitively rules on this issue, the dual test it applied
in parole hearings at least gives practitioners a framework from which
to formulate arguments on the trustworthiness of residual hearsay.
b. More Probative than any Other Evidence.-An effective
method by which the court can limit the application of the residual
expectations would be to require, as the text of the rule commands,
that any evidence proffered be the most probative on point. A test to
determine the meaning of "more probative" remains an open ques-
tion at this time. By setting this hurdle very high, as the Fourth Cir-
cuit has done, 5  Maryland courts can accomplish the Rule
Committee's goal to restrict the residual exceptions to "exceptional
78. Id. at 696-97, 612 A.2d at 291-92.
79. Id. at 701-05, 612 A.2d 293-95; see also Beach v. State, 75 Md. App. 431, 541 A.2d
1012 (1988) (ruling that letters from state-sanctioned probation program were reliable
because of trustworthy source and absence of motive to fabricate).
80. Bailey, 327 Md. at 709, 612 A.2d at 295.
81. Id. at 705, 612 A.2d at 295.
82. Id. at 704-05, 612 A.2d at 295-96.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Van Lufkins, 676 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1982) (looking both
to circumstances surrounding making of hearsay and to outside corroboration); United
States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1978) ("IT]he trustworthiness of a statement
should be analyzed by evaluating not only the facts corroborating the veracity of the state-
ment, but also the circumstances in which the declarant made the statement and the in-
centive he had to speak truthfully or falsely.").
84. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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circumstances." 6 Similarly, the court could strictly require that there
be no other evidence available through "reasonable efforts." This
dual requirement of probativeness and availability offers the court a
solid foundation on which to limit use of the residual hearsay excep-
tions significantly.
c. Notice Requireent.-The restrictive wording of the com-
mittee note suggests that the notice requirement also will be strictly
applied. Strict adherence to the notice requirement would severely
limit use of the residual hearsay exception by precluding its invoca-
tion once a trial has begun.
Despite this conclusion, it is not difficult to imagine circum-
stances under which courts would allow at least some flexibility in the
notice requirement. Where a witness is suddenly unavailable or un-
willing to testify, and the proponent is blameless, a court might rea-
sonably allow the hearsay to be admitted even absent notice prior to
trial.8 7 Blind adherence to the notice requirement in such a situation
would not further the interests of justice. A more advisable course
would follow the Fourth Circuit and accept a flexible notice doctrine
but limit its use to extreme circumstances. 8 In such a situation, a
court could offer a continuance to allow the opponent to prepare for
the evidence, as some of the federal circuits now do. 9
3. Effect on Trial Practice.-To evaluate the effect the residual
hearsay exception will have on trial practice in Maryland, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind the limited situations in which the rule applies.9"
With the existence of twenty-seven well-established hearsay excep-
86. "[M]ore probative ... than any other evidence," MD. R. 5-803(b)(24), is akin to
most probative. A strict application of such a standard would eliminate all redundant evi-
dence and place a heavy burden on proponents to show why the evidence in question is
essential to their case.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that the
notice requirement should not be strictly construed), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); see
supra note 64.
88. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1978) (ruling that defendant
was not prejudiced by admission of residual hearsay evidence because trial judge granted
him adequate time to research and conduct interviews).
90. As of 1992, the residual hearsay exception has been reported in more than 140
federal and more than 90 state cases. Beaver, supra note 21, at 790 (citing STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, 360-74, 436-38
(5th ed. 1990) & 78-81, 90-93 (Supp. 1992)). Beaver uses these figures to argue that the
residual exceptions are being used generally, not in the rare and exceptional circum-
stances for which they were intended. Id. at 790-91. But, when one considers the enor-
mous quantity of cases reported in all federal and state courts combined, fewer than 250
uses of the residual exceptions would seem quite rare indeed.
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tions, each with a long history of case law detailing its application, a
practitioner should turn to the residual exception only as a last resort.
Until the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals rules
on whether Maryland will apply the notice requirement strictly or flex-
ibly, any attempt to use the residual exceptions should be handled by
a motion in limine.9 Such a motion would satisfy the notice require-
ment and allow both parties to plan their trial strategy accordingly. In
any case, the proponent should always notify the adverse party before
trial if there is any possibility such evidence might be introduced at
trial. Similarly, to satisfy the equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness requirement, a practitioner should follow the two-pro-
nged test of intrinsic reliability and extrinsic corroboration used by
the Court of Appeals in Bailey.92
There is, of course, no guarantee against reversal for improper
admission of hearsay under the residual exception. For example,
should the Court of Appeals adopt a rule that looks only to intrinsic
guarantees of trustworthiness, it could reverse a decision that admit-
ted evidence when both intrinsic and extrinsic proof had been of-
fered. The court could find reversible error, reasoning that a trial
court was unduly influenced by the corroborative evidence that was, in
hindsight, improperly introduced. But, until the court adopts a differ-
ent policy, the most pragmatic course is to offer both intrinsic and
extrinsic proof of trustworthiness.
The matter of the relative level of probativeness of the hearsay
necessary for admission under the residual exceptions is also best han-
dled by a motion in limine. In deference to the limiting language of
the Committee note, it is probable that trial courts will apply this re-
quirement strictly unless instructed to do otherwise by a higher court.
It would be important that the offered evidence be the most probative
on point and that no other similar evidence be reasonably available.
4. Conclusion.-The inclusion of the residual hearsay exceptions
in the new Maryland Rules of Evidence represents a significant
change from Maryland's common law. Residual hearsay exceptions
are by their nature rules of limited application. While it is unlikely
that the exceptions will be used on any regular basis, there is the po-
tential to open the door to evidence previously inadmissible. How far
91. A motion in limine is made pretrial and requests that the court prohibit opposing
counsel from referring to or offering one or more pieces of evidence. BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1013-14 (6th ed. 1990). The motion can also be used in a pro-active manner by a
proponent of a particular piece of evidence to insure its later admission at trial.
92. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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this door opens and the degree to which the new exceptions change
Maryland trial practice will depend entirely upon future decisions of
Maryland's appellate courts.
JEFFREY E. GREENE
C. General Evidentiary Objections Still Valid in Maryland
1. Introduction-The new Maryland Rules of Evidence offer
practitioners a convenient and streamlined set of rules that will bene-
fit trial practice in terms of both judicial economy and legal clarity.I
Although modeled in part on Federal Rule 103, Maryland Rule 5-103
retains several attributes of the former Maryland common-law and
court rules that governed objections to evidentiary rulings for preser-
vation on appeal.2 These disparities between new Maryland Rule 5-
103 and its well-established federal counterpart are significant and
may serve to undermine many of the advantages and opportunities
sought through the codification process.
In effect, Maryland Rule 5-103, which changes current Maryland
practice very little, contains three significant differences from Federal
Rule 103. First, the Federal Rule requires that an attorney state the
specific ground of objection 3 while the Maryland Rule only requires
that an attorney state a general objection.4 Second, in Maryland, er-
ror may only be predicated on a ruling by which a party is
"prejudiced,"5 while in federal court, error may be predicated on a
ruling in which "a substantial right of the party is affected."6 Finally,
the Federal Rule expressly allows the appellate court to take notice of
plain errors that affect substantial rights although they were not
brought to the attention of the trial court,7 while the Maryland Rule
does not.
This Note will discuss the provisions of the new Maryland Rule
and contrast them with the provisions of Federal Rule 103. Through
this comparison, the likely effects of new Maryland Rule 5-103 on trial
and appellate practice will be examined. The Note will also briefly
address the matter of motions in limine which is treated tangentially by
the new rule.
1. See LYNN MCIAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE § 1.2 (1994).
2. See MCLAIN, supra note 1, §§ 2.103.2 to 2.103.3.
3. FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1).
4. MD. R. 5-103(a)(1).
5. MD. R. 5-103(a).
6. FED. R. EVID. 103(a).
7. See FED. R. EvrD. 103(d).
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